S E C R E T Section 01 of 05 Khartoum 06366

London for Young; Paris for Moran
E.O. 12356; DECL:OADR
Tags: PREL, KISL, PTER, SU
Subject: Sudanese mischief-making: does it matter?

ref: a) dushanbe 2573 (notal); b) nouakchott 3541

1. Secret/NOFORN entire text.

Summary

2 Summary. The GOS/NIF is indoctrinating its people in its radical, anti-western version of Islam. It promotes its ideology abroad by training and helping foreign Islamists and by proselytizing through Islamist non-governmental organizations. The GOS/NIF also seeks to export political change by force, as evidenced by its efforts to destabilize Eritrea and Uganda. Moreover, the GOS/NIF supports most major Middle Eastern terrorist groups.

3. The import of these activities should not be overstated: terrorists will continue to operate, stability in the Horn of Africa will remain precarious, and radical Islamists worldwide will continue to oppose the U.S. with or without Sudan's help. GOS/NIF behavior, however, makes things worse on all three scores. One of the poorest countries in the world, Sudan nonetheless succeeds in projecting influence abroad; unfortunately, it is uniformly negative in terms of U.S. values and interests. End summary.

4. Since the GOS/NIF seized power in 1989 it has become increasingly clear that this ostensibly military government is a tool of Sudan's National Islamic Front (NIF). Speaking to U.S. officials, senior officials of the GOS and the NIF that controls it often portray themselves as "moderate" Islamists. They say they bear no fundamental hostility to the West or to the U.S., and blame strained U.S-Sudanese relations on an alleged U.S. bias against Islam.

GOS/NIF seeks to indoctrinate Sudan...

5. Their protestations, however, are belied by the extremist message the regime propounds to the Sudanese. The ubiquitous GOS/NIF propaganda campaign promotes a militant and intolerant version of Islam. Although Sudanese belong to a variety of creeds, official rhetoric treats Islam as the de facto state religion and advocates infusing all of society with its values. Official propaganda extols the war in the south as a "jihad" (holy war) against unbelievers.

6. Nowhere, perhaps, is the extremism of GOS/NIF Islamist propaganda more apparent than in its treatment of the West. GOS/NIF officials routinely depict the West as ungodly, decadent, and hostile. They single out the U.S. for special attack, portraying it as a malevolent power bent on combating Islam. This drumbeat is relentless and pervasive.

7. It is a staple of the GOS-controlled media, which are full of commentaries, articles, editorials, and songs lambasting the U.S. A popular video the T.V. is running sums up the message, portraying the U.S. as the foe. Images of U.S. forces are contrasted with shots of the GOS's Islamic Popular Defence Forces (PDF) marching proudly by. Other images show lightning symbolically striking the U.S. Statue of Liberty. The lyrics amplify the theme of the U.S. as the enemy. Such propaganda is daily media fare.

8. The GOS/NIF's radical Islamist message, with its strong anti-U.S. component, is conveyed in other ways as well. Tens of thousands of Sudanese a year absorb heavy doses of it in Popular Defense Forces' training. (PDF songs often describe how the PDF will defeat the Americans.) Pro-NIF teachers relay the message in schools and universities, and GOS-appointed preachers echo the themes in sermons at mosques.

9. Just how much impact this propaganda has is hard to tell. Many Sudanese dismiss it out of hand. Others, however, especially among the young and less educated, heed it more. Many have no other source of information on the outside world. Moroever, Sudanese Muslims are often deeply religious. By portraying Islam as under U.S. assault, GOS/NIF propaganda elicits among some an emotional response. We think this propaganda is convincing a segment of opinion that Islam is threatened and that the U.S. is the foe.

...and tries to promote radicalism worldwide

10. The GOS/NIF is not content, however, with pushing radical Islam at home. It promotes its worldview abroad as well. A special university in Khartoum, Africa International University (AIU), schools thousands of foreigners, mostly Africans, in the NIF version of Islam. Almost all are on scholarships. Foreigners also have scholarships to other Sudanese universities where the teaching likewise leans heavily toward radical Islam, with a strong anti-Western component.

11. Upon graduating, these students are expected to go home to impart what they have learned. Admittedly, just as Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University produced its share of anti-Communists, not all foreign students are impressed with what they see and hear in Sudan. Still, a number leave convinced.

12. The GOS/NIF further promotes radical Islam through extensive ties to like-minded Islamists worldwide. Two instruments to this end are the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC), headed by NIF Secretary General Hassan Turabi, and the Council for International Peoples' Friendship (CIPF), headed by a Turabi protege.

13. The PAIC and the CIPF maintain links with groups as disparate as Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam and Islamist groups in Tajikstan and Kashmir. Although the nature of these contacts is shadowy, the PAIC and CIPF clearly offer other Islamist groups encouragement and moral support. We know the PAIC and CIPF have also, on occasion, funded foreign Islamists.

14. Other tools for spreading the Islamist agenda are Sudanese Islamic non-governmental organizations, among which Dawa Islamiiya, Muwafaq, and the Islamic African Relief Association (IARA) are the best known. They operate in several foreign countries, notably in Africa. Ostensibly engaged in benevolent work, these NIF instruments also spread NIF views. The fact that the cash-strapped GOS/NIF spends millions of dollars a year on AIU, the PAIC and CIPF, and Islamic NGOs speaks of its commitment to spreading its version of Islam among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The message being spread includes, of course, hostility to the West and the U.S.

GOS/NIF destabilizing neighbors...

15. Nor does the GOS/NIF merely peacefully peddle its views abroad. It is not loathe to exporting political change by force. GOS/NIF support for the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, an Islamist movement that seeks the violent overthrow of the Eritrean government, led Asmara to break diplomatic relations with Khartoum recently. There is also convincing evidence the GOS/NIF is materially assisting the insurgent Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda.

16. Given the secretive nature of GOS/NIF links to many Islamist groups, it probable but not proven that it is supporting destabilization efforts elsewhere as well. In the past six months, however, Sudanese Islamists have been arrested for subversion as far afield as Mauritania and Tajikstan (refs a and b). This raises the possibility that Sudanese Islamists may have an agenda for destabilization that goes beyond Sudan's immediate neighbors.

...and supporting terrorism

17. Besides befriending radical Islamists worldwide, the GOS/NIF is specifically sollicitous of terrorists. It has an open door policy for every Middle Eastern terrorist group. Hamas, the various factions of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Abu Nidal organization, Hizballah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) all are present here, often in a significant fashion, with the blessing of the GOS.

18. The international terroristd Carlos lived here for more than a year with the protection of senior GOS officials before Khartoum, under pressure from France, reluctantly turned him over. Renegade Saudi businessman Osama bin Laden, a patron of international Islamist extremists, has moved his home and headquarters to Sudan.

19. Thanks to GOS/NIF hospitality, terrorists of every description can gather quietly in Sudanese safe-houses, far from the unwanted attention of their home-country security services. Sudan has also provided different groups material assistance at various times. Only a few weeks ago Israel publicly produced a Hamas member captured in the occupied territories, who confessed he had received military training in Sudan. Also a few weeks ago, Tunisia disclosed it had arrested ten Tunisian terrorists who had trained in Sudan (ref c). Reporting in other channels shows that the GOS/NIF has helped funnel weapons to the FIS and given arms, training, funds and travel documents to other terrorist groups.

Does it matter?

20. In fairness to the GOS/NIF, it is not the first government in the region to support its neighbors' insurgents. Arguably, Uganda began supporting the Sudan People's Liberation Army before Sudan responded by helping the LRA. GOS/NIF efforts to undermine Eritrea, on the other hand, are unprovoked.

21. We defer to Kampala and Asmara for a definitive analysis of the danger GOS/NIF behavior poses to Uganda and Eritrea. Our sense is that in both cases it is troublesome but not regime-threatening. However, this reflects more, in our view, the strengths of both regimes than a lack of a serious effort on the GOS/NIF's part to cause trouble. And it remains that Khartoum is flouting international standards of behavior and earnestly fomenting rebellion in countries where stability is a recent and hard-won gain. At some point, if the GOS/NIF keeps trying hard enough, its efforts might be more successful, either in these two countries or elsewhere.

22. Regarding terrorism, Sudan, to the best of our knowledge, has stopped short of directly sponsoring an act of international terrorism. Moreover, the groups Sudan abets are, first and foremost, a product of the internal tensions in the countries where they were born. Hamas, the PIJ, or the FIS will exist with or without GOS/NIF help. Furthermore, the nature of this aid is limited. Sudan is too poor and too weak a state to give them more than limited help.

23. This is not, however, the same as saying that GOS/NIF support for terrorism does not matter. The low or no-cost assistance Sudan can readily provide -- safe places where terrorists can meet, train, or simply rest and recuperate discreetly -- is of no small value to clandestine terrorist groups.

24. Terrorism, moreover, remains a relatively low-cost undertaking. It does not take massive infusions of weapons or cash to increase a terrorist group's ability to do harm. Even dirt-poor Sudan can give enough to make a difference in this regard. Again, the groups Sudan helps do not need the GOS/NIF to thrive; the help does enhance, however, their ability to cause trouble. The bottom line is that any help terrorists receive is too much help.

25. Lastly, does it matter that Sudan indoctrinates its own people and others in radical Islam? It probably does. Precisely what impact Sudanese-trained Islamists have when they return to their home countries is impossible to tell. At a minimum, however, Sudan's efforts are increasing the numbers of those, in and out of Sudan, committed to militant Islam and convinced the U.S. is its foe. This can do no good and can cause some harm.

26. It is probably no accident that most of the defendents in the current New York City bombings trial are Sudanese. This is not to say that the GOS/NIF directed them to commit terrorism in the U.S. We do think, however, that GOS/NIF radical propaganda may have helped them convince themselves the U.S. was a major enemy of Islam. From there on it became easier for them to conclude that anti-American terrorism was justified in the name of jihad.

27. In the final analysis, the GOS/NIF's ability to do harm must not be overstated. Middle Eastern terrorists will still operate, regional stability in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa will remain fragile, and radical Islamists worldwide will continue to revile and oppose the U.S. regardless of what Sudan does or does not do. GOS/NIF behavior, however, makes things worse on all three scores.

28. Ironically, this fourth-world country that ranks on the bottom rung of almost every indice of development -- per capita GDP, levels of literacy and infant mortality, and the like -- manages to project influence abroad. Unfortunately, it is uniformly negative in terms of U.S. interests and valves. GOS/NID mischief-making thus does matter. Just how much it matters depends how much one values the international legality Sudan brazenly flouts.

Benedict